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Abstract
I investigated the eﬀect of the presence of a group of non-active subjects upon the behavior of active
players in a Ultimatum bargaining game. In the experiment a subject with the role of P has to oﬀer a
share r of a sum S to a subject with the role of AR who belongs to a group and decides on behalf of
his group’s members (players R). If AR rejects the P’s oﬀer, both active and non-active players get zero,
if AR accepts the oﬀer then P gets S − r while r is equally divided between AR and the members of
his group. Every subject assumes all the three roles (P, AR and R) and the group size is manipulated
keeping constant the share S/N (with N=number of subjects, either active or non active, involved in the
game)
Data suggest that active players tend to behave as they were playing a standard two-person Ultima-
tum game. A clear insensitivity to changes in group size by subjects playing as P, emerging in the main
experiment, is compatible with the hyphotesis that at the basis of their behavior there is a willingness
to gain a payoﬀ which satisﬁes an ex-ante ﬁxed aspiration level, that for most of them corresponds to
about half of S.
The interpretation of the decisions taken by subjects under the AR role is more complicated as,
although most of them show a behavior which is compatible with the one observed in the standard
Ultimatum Game, a non-negligible share of players ﬁx very low acceptance thresholds that could be
explainained in terms of a shift from the willingness to punish unfair behaviors to the responsibility for
others’ wellbeing.
The experimental analysis of norms of fairness and reciprocity has become one of
most promising strand of economic and decision theory research. The results gathered
in twenty years of experiments have contributed to uncover the limits of models of
human agents as motivated only by the maximization of their own material payoﬀ. At
the same time a number of theories have been introduced aiming at explaining the
experimental evidence by means of models based on the hypothesis that agents have a
multiplicity of motivations, maximization of their own material payoﬀ being only one
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among them(see for example Fehr & Schmidt (1999),Bolton & Ockenfels (2000),Falk &
Fischbacher (2001)).
Although social norms play a crucial role in this theories, we still know little about
the way in which they inﬂuence individual behaviour, and in particular many questions
remain to be answered about the determinants of the salience of speciﬁc norms within
speciﬁc contexts, the interplay between self-interest and norm-driven behaviour and the
variables that inﬂuence the balance between these two classes of motives.
Recently, an increasing number of researchers are trying to isolate some of these
variables introducing, for example, experiments in which the social distance among the
players is manipulated by means of some form of communication or group identiﬁcation.
In my work I focussed on this kind of research and I investigated the eﬀects of the
presence of a group upon the choices of individuals involved in Ultimatum bargaining
games, with the objective of assessing the inﬂuence of both group identiﬁcation and cost
of compliance on the deﬁnition of what is considered to be fair in a speciﬁc context.
In the following section I will brieﬂy introduce the basic Ultimatum Game and the
literature about the role of groups in Ultimatum bargaining, then I will proceed with
the description of the experiment.
1 Groups and Ultimatum bargaining
The standard Ultimatum Game is a two-player sequential game in which the ﬁrst mover,
the Proposer, has to decide how to divide a sum of money (S) between himself and a
second mover, the Responder, who can either accept or refuse the Proposer’s oﬀer.
If the Responder accepts the oﬀer, then the sum is divided according the Proposer’s
will, if he refuses, both players get zero. According to game theory, being the players
exclusively motivated by the maximization of their own material payoﬀ, we should
expect to observe a Proposer’s oﬀer corresponding to a minimal share of the sum, ε,
always accepted by the Responder, that has to choose between ε, if he accepts, and
zero, if he refuses.
As shown by the experimental evidence produced in the last two decades - with
hundreds of replications of the basic experimental design (G¨ uth et al. (1982)) in diﬀerent
countries and under diﬀerent conditions (Roth (1995)) and Bearden (2001))what real
people do is not consistent with the self-interest hypothesis at the basis of the standard
rational choice theory, in fact Proposers oﬀer on average a share between 30% and 50%
of the sum (with 50% as modal oﬀer) and Responders tend to refuse oﬀers below 25%
of the sum with a probability of 50%.
Most of the research about Ultimatum bargaining has been devoted to the study of
two-person games and only in the last few years some scholars have shown interest in
experiments based on games with more players.
G¨ uth & van Damme (1998) designed an experiment based on a three-person Ultima-
tum Game in which the Proposer has to decide how to allocate a sum among himself,
a Responder and a third player (dummy) who does not have an active role in the in-
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teraction. As in the basic game, the Responder can choose, under diﬀerent information
conditions, whether to accept or refuse the oﬀer, if he refuses all the players get zero.
The main result of the study is that the Proposer exploits the information conditions
choosing proposals that could be perceived by the active Responder as fair. In any case,
neither the Proposer nor the Responder seem to care much about the dummy player’s
payoﬀ. A similar result has been obtained with the manipulation of the consolation
prize for the dummy player in Kagel & Wolfe (2001) experiment 1.
This kind of experiments is characterized by a framing of the game as an interaction
amongst a triad of players and not between a Proposer and a group of Responders. In
fact, they are not designed with the aim to explore the role of group membership
upon individual decision making, but to test the explanation power of models of social
preferences based on the “relative income” (Bolton & Ockenfels (2000)) or the “inequity
aversion” (Fehr & Schmidt (1999)) hypotheses, and in particular to shed light on the role
of intentionality in the deﬁnition of fairness as well as on the problem of the deﬁnition
of the natural reference group, conceived as the set of subjects whose payoﬀs enter the
utility function of the active players (Kagel & Wolfe (2001)).
The eﬀect of group identiﬁcation upon players’ behaviour in Ultimatum bargaining
games has been explicitly considered by researchers interested in testing the relevance
of the so-called “minimal group eﬀect” hypothesis (Tajfel & Turner (1979)). According
to this hypothesis the simple deﬁnition of an individual as a member of a group would
trigger a strong feeling of membership and the adoption of a cooperative attitude to-
wards the members of his group and a competitive attitude toward outsiders. Although
understanding this kind of mechanism can be very useful for the study of norm-driven
behaviour, there is still a lack of consensus among psychologists about the appropriate
explanation of it. The experiments conducted so far about the possible role of this
eﬀect in Ultimatum-like situations 2 have not provided conclusive evidence.
Finally, there is growing interest in the comparison between group and individual
performances in bargaining experiments. The focus here is on team decision dynamics
and their eﬀects on the outcome of the allocation process. With regard to Ultimatum
bargaining, some experiments have been conducted in which groups of people are called
to collectively play either as a Proposer or as a Responder: The aim of the researchers is
to understand why, as the experimental results seem to suggest, the group decision mak-
ing process could lead to a more selﬁsh, and consequently to a more rational, behaviour
(Messick et al. (1997), Robert & Carnevale (1997), Bornstein & Yaniv (1998)).
In my study I assumed a point of view characterized by an explicit framing of the
game as an interaction between a single individual and a group. In particular I was
interested in the eﬀects, upon both the Proposer and the Responder’s behaviour, of the
presence of a group on the side of the Responder. I did not considered the collective
choice process, but I analyzed a game played by a single Proposer and a Responder
who is part of a group and who decides also on behalf of the other members of his
1See also Riedl & Vyrastekova (2002) and Bolton & Ockenfels (1998)
2See for example Robert & Carnevale (1997) and Buchan et al. (2002)
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group. What could one expect to observe in such a context? Does the presence of a
group behind the Responder inﬂuence the Proposer oﬀer? If yes, in which direction?
And how does a Responder with such a particular role perceive the Proposer’s oﬀers?
In section 2 the experimental design and procedure are described; results are pre-
sented in section 3 and few conclusive remarks end the paper (section 4)
2 Experimental design and procedure
The experiment was based on a game in which a subject with the role of P plays as
a Proposer in a Ultimatum Game, oﬀering a division of a sum of money to a subject
with the role of AR (Active Responder) who is part of a group and decides whether to
accept or refuse the P’s oﬀer also on behalf of the members of his group (players R).
The group membership was based on a random draw and there were neither interaction
nor identiﬁcation amongst the members of the groups.3
The experiment took place at the Computable and Experimental Economics Labo-
ratory (CEEL) of the University of Trento in June 2004. It consisted of four sessions,
and sixty students participated in it, with ﬁfteen students per sessions. Each subject
received a show-up fee of e5 for the participation. The whole experiment lasted two
days (two sessions per day).
The entire experiment has been conducted under condition of absolute anonymity
and through the use of personal computers.
Each session was divided in two phases: the 1vs4 game and the 1vs2 game.
In the 1vs4 game, using a random draw, 3 player were assigned the role of P. The
remaining 12 players were divided into 3 groups of four people and within each group
a member was randomly selected as the AR player 4.
Each player P was coupled with one player AR and they were invted to play a
Ultimatum game with the following structure: P is given a sum S (e25) and he can
oﬀer a share r (from 0 to 25) of that sum to AR. AR can either accept or refuse the
oﬀer. If he refuses then P gets 0, AR gets 0 and the member of the AR’s group get 0;
if he accepts, P gets S − r, AR and each member of his group get r/4.
In our setting, active players could make their choice selecting some (one for P and
one or more for AR) of the possible division options ranging from {25,0} to {0,25}5which
3Two pilot experiment were run before the main one, using a less complicated procedure. Both
the pilots were based on the same game used in the main experiment and the only diﬀerence between
the two consisted in the introduction, in the second pilot, of the possibility of communcation among
the members of the group in a pre-experimental phase, before knowing what would have happened in
the following phases. The observation of the same interesting pattern of behavior shown both by the
Proposers and the Responders, in both the preliminary studies, induced me to depeen the analysis of
the active player’s behavior, setting aside the study of the role of communication amongst the members
of AR’s group.
4A window with role and group number (for players AR and R) appeared on the computer screen
of each subject.
5The ﬁrst number is always the sum that P asks for himself. The options were fourteen
({25,0},{23,2}, {21,4}...{3,22}{1,24}{0,25})
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appear on their computer screen. If the option chosen by P is included in the set of
options selected by AR then the oﬀer is accepted.6
After P and AR’s choices, a new round started with a new selection of P players,
groups and AR players. This procedure was repeated for ﬁve rounds.
The selection mechanism was so designed that each subject assumed the roles of P
and AR once. In addition, as a P (AR) the single subject did never play the game with
same AR (P) more than once. At the beginning of each round the subjects were not
aware of the outcomes of the previous rounds. At the end of this ﬁve rounds players
passed to the 1vs2 game (second phase), consisting of three round.
In each round of the 1vs2 game (second phase) ﬁve subjects were selected for the
role of P, the remaining ten subjects were assigned to ﬁve groups of two members each,
and within each group a member was selected for the role of AR.
As in the ﬁrst phase each subject assumed once each of the active roles 7.
P and AR were involved in the same game as in the ﬁrst phase, but now the Proposer
had to divide a sum of e15 between himself and a group composed of one AR and one
R, selecting one of the options from a list ranging from {15,0} to {0,15} with steps of
e1.
At the end of the second phase the software drew one of the ﬁve rounds of the
ﬁrst phase and one of the three rounds of the second phase and the subjects were paid
according to the outcomes of those rounds 8 . The outcomes were communicated, and
the subjects were paid.
This procedure has been adopted with the aim to deepen the study of some aspects
of the active players’ behaviour. In particular, with regard to the P role, the objective
was to ﬁnd additional evidence about the relevance of quasi- ﬁfty-ﬁfty divisions in the
1vs4 game, and, with the introduction of the 1vs2 treatment, to look at the role of the
cost of fair oﬀers.
If we consider the two games that the subjects are called to play we can note that in
the ﬁrst one (1vs4) oﬀering the fair share imply a cost of e20 (80% of S). In the second
game (1vs2), where P has to divide the sum with a group composed of two player and
where the fair share is the same, this cost becomes of e10 (66% of S). More generally
oﬀering one euro in the 1vs2 game costs less then oﬀering one euro in the 1vs4 game.
6Such a procedure, which imply the use of the so called strategy method (Selten (1967)), has been
adopted with the aim to collect as much information as possible about the Responder’s preferences.
7Given the composition of the groups, in the ﬁrst phase each subject assumed the role of R three
times, in phase two he assumed this role only once.
8This is a form of the procedure known as “random lottery incentive system” (Starmer & Sugden
(1991) and Cubitt et al. (1998)). Players play eight rounds knowing that and they will be paid
according to the outcome of the two rounds that will be selected. In particular, at the beginning of
the ﬁrst game, subjects were informed about the fact that, even if they would have played ﬁve rounds
of the 1vs4 game, only one round would have been selected. Moving to the second phase, a new set of
instruction were given to the subjects, with similar information about the 1vs2 game.
Note that with this design the round in which one assumes an active role (P or AR) can be selected
with a probability of 2/5 in the ﬁrst phase and 2/3 in the second phase. This probability is exactly
the same of that of being selected as an active player in the one-shot games (2/5 in the 1vs4 game and
2/3 in the 1vs2 game)
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Figure 1: Choice under P role
Concerning the AR role, adopting this design should allow us to ﬁnd additional
evidence on the AR players’ propensity to ﬁx low acceptance thresholds and, at the
same time, to evaluate the eﬀect of group dimension on their behaviour.
2.1 Results
I collected a total of 58 observations for each phase 9.
Le me start by considering the choices of the subjects when they play the P role.
2.1.1 The behaviour of subjects under the P role
The distributions of oﬀers in the two games are shown in ﬁgure 1.
When playing the P role in 1vs4 game, subjects oﬀered on average e11,52 to the
whole group, corresponding to 46% of the sum and to 11,5% for each member of the
group. The ratio between the payoﬀ of each member of the group and the player P’s
payoﬀ has been on average of 0,21. The modal oﬀer was e12 (48% of S) and 75% of
the oﬀers were below e 14 (56% of S). There was only one fair share oﬀer.
Thus, the oﬀers are smaller then the ones observed in the pilot experiments, but
the willingness to oﬀer a share around the 50% to the whole group is conﬁrmed.
The distribution of oﬀers in game 1vs2 has a higher variance, with a mean of e 6,81
(45,4% of S). On average, each member of the group is oﬀered a share fo 22,7% of the
total sum, corresponding 41% of player P’s payoﬀ. The modal oﬀer is e8 (53,3% of S)
and 75% of the oﬀers are below e8.
Moving from 1vs4 game to 1vs2 game the number of the fair share oﬀers increases
up to 8. The higher frequency of fair share oﬀers could be interpreted as a sign of
the eﬀect of the lower cost of norm compliance, but the observation of the presence of
eleven e5 oﬀers (33% of S) and of the relevance of oﬀers close to the ﬁfty-ﬁfty division
suggests the need for a deeper analysis of passage from the 1vs4 to the 1vs2 game.
At a ﬁrst glance, players’s attitude towards the representative of the group does not
change much passing from the four-people group to the two-people groups. A Spearmen
9I excluded from the analysis the choices of two subjects who probably did not understand the
game, choosing only one alternative when playing as AR.
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correlation index of 0,71 between the oﬀers in the 1vs4 game and the ones in 1vs2, t-test
for paired sample (pvalue=0,65) and F-test(p-value=0,47) conﬁrm this impression, but
we can get more information by looking at the cost of the single oﬀers, deﬁned as the
share of the sum that P gives away.
If we classify the subjects according to the cost of their oﬀers (share of the sum that
they decide to give away) in the 1vs4 game we can see that, within each class, when
moving to the 1vs2 game players tend to choose an oﬀer that on average have a cost
which is very close to the cost of oﬀer made in the 1vs4 game. In addition, subjects
who paid a low cost in the 1vs4 tend to bear higher costs in the 1vs2 game (see ﬁgure
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Figure 2: Cost of P’oﬀers in the 1vs4 game and average
cost of P’s oﬀers in the 1vs2 game
Table 1: Cost of P’oﬀers in the 1vs4 game and average cost of P’s oﬀers in the 1vs2
game
1vs4 % of Individual Average Individual
share players share 1v2 share share
0,00 1,72% 0,00 0,20 0,10
0,08 3,45% 0,02 0,10 0,05
0,16 1,72% 0,04 0,20 0,10
0,24 6,90% 0,06 0,35 0,18
0,32 6,90% 0,08 0,38 0,19
0,40 17,24% 0,10 0,43 0,22
0,48 25,86% 0,12 0,46 0,23
0,56 18,97% 0,14 0,52 0,26
0,64 10,34% 0,16 0,58 0,29
0,72 5,17% 0,18 0,58 0,29
0,80 1,72% 0,20 0,67 0,34
Looking at table 1 we can also observe that players who show the most signiﬁcant
changes in the share oﬀered represent less than 30 % of the sample.
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Figure 3: Choice under AR role
What seems to emerge is the heterogeneity of subjects with regard to the cost they
are willing to bear when they have to decide how much to oﬀer (or, in a complementary
view, with regard to the share that they want to keep for themselves) with a majority
of the subjects that are ready to give away among 40-50% of the sum.
The most puzzling fact is that this disposition seems not to be aﬀected by the
absolute amount of money and by the size of the group. In fact this behaviour is
compatible with the evidence from the standard-two person ultimatum game and the
triads experiments.
2.1.2 The behaviour of subjects under the AR role
As already emerged in the pilots, most of the subjects, when playing as AR, ﬁxed a
minimal acceptance threshold, choosing an ordered sequence of options 10 Nevertheless,
some of them chose a set of options without considering as acceptable some of the most
favourable allocation. We might think that they considere these allocation as little
probable. 11
The distribution of the acceptance thresholds in the two games is illustrated in ﬁgure
3.
The average acceptance threshold in the 1vs4 game is e9,14 (36,5% of S), the mode
is 12 (48% of S). The new data, then, conﬁrm the evidence from pilots experiments.
In the 1vs2 subjects chose on average a threshold of e5,46 (36,4% of S), with a
modal oﬀer of e 8 (53 % of S).
It is worth nothing the relevance of very low threshold as the e2 in the 1vs4 and
the e1 in the 1vs2 game.
Thus, 75% of the subject are ready to accept oﬀers corresponding to less then 48%
in the ﬁrst game and less then 53,3% in the second game, with a share for each member
of the group of 12%(about half of the fair share) of S in the 1vs4 game and of 26,6%
10Choosing all the option from {25-x, x } to {0,25}, where x can be considered as the acceptance
threshold.
11An alternative explanation can be suggested by an experiment conduced in China , in which the
reserachers observed subject who refuse both very low and very high oﬀers, both considered as unfair
(Hennig-Schmidt et al. (2002))
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of S in the 1vs2 game . Such individual shares imply a ratio between AR’s payoﬀ and
P’s payoﬀ of about 0,23 in the 1vs4 game and of 0,57 in the 1vs2. With regard to the
comparison of the 1vs4 with the 1vs2 choices, a Spearman correlation index of 0,80,
t-test (p-value=0,61) and F-test (p-value=0,84) allow us to exclude the existence of
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Figure 4: AR’s threshold in the two games
Also in this case some additional information can be drawn from the classiﬁcation
of the subjects on the basis of the share they ask in the 1vs4 game. What we can see,
again, is that, within each class, when moving to the 1vs2 game, players tend to ﬁx
thresholds that, in terms of share of S, are on average close to the shares in the 1vs4
game (see ﬁgure 4 and table 2). Players who have shown the most signiﬁcant changes
in moving from 1v4 to 1vs2 represent less than 17% of the sample.
Table 2: AR’s threshold in the two games
1vs4 % of Individual Average 1vs2 Individual
threshold players share threshold share
0,08 17,24% 0,02 0,07 0,04
0,16 6,90% 0,04 0,27 0,13
0,24 5,17% 0,06 0,40 0,20
0,32 13,79% 0,08 0,34 0,17
0,40 17,24% 0,10 0,38 0,19
0,48 22,41% 0,12 0,44 0,22
0,56 8,62% 0,14 0,55 0,27
0,64 3,45% 0,16 0,53 0,27
0,72 5,17% 0,18 0,58 0,29
The same share guarantees an individual payoﬀ in the 1vs2 that is double the one in
the 1vs4 game, but the focus seems to be more on the maximum share that should be
left to the Proposer and consequently to the group as a whole and less on the individual
payoﬀs of the members.
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2.2 Moving from P role to AR role
We can conclude our review of the experimental results, considering the relation between
the subject’s decision as player P and his decision as player AR.
Following G¨ uth et al. (1982)we can identify three classes of subjects by looking at
the relation between their choice as P player and their choice as AR player. In the 1vs4
game 12% of the subjects are characterized by conﬂictual decisions, in fact, having
ﬁxed, as AR, a threshold higher than the oﬀer made as P, they would have rejected
the oﬀer they actually seggested as P. 24% behaved in a consistent way, with identical
acceptance threshold and oﬀer. Finally, 64% showed an anti-conﬂictual behaviour ﬁxing
a threshold below the oﬀer made as P. In particular, they asked on average 63% of what
they oﬀered as P.
Moving to the 1vs2 game, the composition of the classes does not change much, with
71% of anti-conﬂictual, 10% conﬂictual and 19% of consistent players. Anti-conﬂictual
player ask, on average, 62% of what they oﬀered as P.
The fact that the distribution of players classiﬁed according to this criteria does not
diﬀer between the two game represents a support of the evidence about the insensitivity
to changes in the size of the group.
3 Discussion and conclusion
The objective of my work was twofold; on the one side I wanted to evaluate the eﬀect
of the presence of a group of non-active players on the side of the Responder in a
Ultimatum bargaining setting upon the decision of the active players (P and AR). At
the same time we wanted to explore the relevance of changes in the group size, holding
the same ratio between the sum to be divided and the total number of individuals
involved, either as active or passive players, in the game.
With regard to the ﬁrst issue, evidence shows a similarity between the behaviour
of subjects playing as P and as AR and the behaviour of Proposers and Responders
usually observed in the standard two-person Ultimatum Game 12 and, as conﬁrmed
by the answers to post-experimental questionnaires, subjects apparently neglect the
distributive consequences of this behaviour.
Changes in the size of the groups, with the resulting decrease of the cost of fair share
oﬀers, do not seem to inﬂuence the subjects’ decisions. In particular, when taking the
role of P, in both the games, subjects seem to be motivated mostly by the willingness
to hold for themselves a share of the sum compatible with a ﬁxed aspiration level,
that for most players is about 50%. This attidute is compatible with the “ﬁxed total
sacriﬁce” behavior observed by Selten & Ockenfels (1998) in the “solidarity game”. In
this game, subjects are assigned to groups of three persons and each member takes part
12There is a striking resemblance between our results and the ones observed by G¨ uth et al. (1982)
in their seminal article on Ultimatum bargaining. In the second version of the simple game (pages
377-380) in which, as in our experiment, the same subjects play both the roles, they observe an average
oﬀer by P of about 45% of the total sum and an average threshold ﬁxed by responders of 36,7%.
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to a lottery in which he can win 10 DM with probability of 2/3 or zero with probability
of 1/3. Before the random draw is made, subjects have to decide how much of their
possible win they are willing to give to the only loser, in the case of two winners, or to
the two losers, in the case in which he was the only winner. What Selten & Ockenfels
(1998) observed is that 36 % of their subjects decided to give the same amount in both
the case of one loser and in the case of two losers. They concluded that subjects of this
type behave as if they decide ex-ante the sum they are willing to give, independently
on the number of individuals that have to share it.
The interpretation of the decisions taken by subjects when they play with the AR
role is more complicated. At a ﬁrst glance, it seems that assuming the role of AR
does not imply changes in the motivations of the subjects who, behaving as they were
playing a two-person Ultimatum Game, comply with the player P’s decision and tend
to accept oﬀers which are far from the fair share payoﬀ for the members of their group.
But the presence of a signiﬁcant proportion of subjects who ﬁx very low thresholds
is noteworthy: one might interpret the behaviour of these subject as compatible with
the standard game theory’s assumption about individual motivations. But if we look
at their decisions as P some doubts emerge about the selﬁsh nature of these players, in
fact, average oﬀers of players who have chosen threshold less or equal to e2 in the 1vs4
game and e1 in the 1vs2 game are of 32% and 28% of the sum respectively.
Assuming a diﬀerent point of view, we can imagine that the behaviour of this class
of subjects is a sign of the inﬂuence of the presence of the group. In particular, we might
think that the adoption of AR role induces a shift of their attention from the willingness
to punish an unfair behaviour to the responsibility for the payoﬀ of the other players.
This would be in line with the evidence gathered by Fershtman & Gneezy (2001)who
ran a Ultimatum Game with a delegate who decides on behalf of either the Proposer
or the Responder. As they have shown, when the delegate is hired by the Proposer
with an observable agency contract, proposals tends to be lower with respect to that
observed under the standard Ultimatum Game condition. A possible interpretation
suggested by the authors is that the delegate might be viewed as a hostage who would
be indirectly damaged by the Responder’s willingness to punish an unfair oﬀer. Thus,
the Responder will accept lower oﬀer and the Proposer, being aware this eﬀect, will
induce his delegate to make lower oﬀers. To test this hyphotesis a condition has been
introduced in which the role of hostage is made explicit: the third subject has not a
speciﬁc function but gets a positive reward if the oﬀer is accepted and gets zero if the
oﬀer is refused. The result is that the average oﬀer in this last condition is even lower
than the one observed in ﬁrst condition.
Being the explanation of the AR ’s choice crucial the study of factors which inﬂu-
ence the interplay between moral and material motivations, future research should be
devoted to a deeper analysis of the decisions of people playing this role.
Further research on the P decisions, especially on the motivational role of ﬁxed
aspiration levels, would be also of great interest for the understanding of the relevance
of behaviour driven by simple-rules in bargaining games.
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